In content-driven reputation systems for collaborative content, users gain or lose reputation according to how their contributions fare: authors of long-lived contributions gain reputation, while authors of reverted contributions lose reputation. Existing content-driven systems are prone to Sybil attacks, in which multiple identities, controlled by the same person, perform coordinated actions to increase their reputation. We show that content-driven reputation systems can be made resistant to such attacks by taking advantage of the fact that the reputation increments and decrements depend on content modifications, which are visible to all.
INTRODUCTION
On-line collaboration is fast becoming one of the primary ways in which information is being created, aggregated, and shared. The success of sites such as the Wikipedia, YouTube, MySpace, and of the many wikis and discussion groups disseminated over the web owes to their ability to harness the contributions of millions of people all over the world. As the volume of such collaborative information grows, so does the problem of assessing its quality, preventing vandalism and spam, and providing incentives to constructive collaboration. Reputation systems have been proposed as a help in this direction.
Some of the largest bodies of collaborative information are versioned: users build on each other's contributions, modifying and improving them. The prime example of such bodies of information are wikis, among which the Wikipedia, currently the largest on-line encyclopedia and the 8th most frequently visited site on the Web. 1 As on-line collaboration expands, versioned information will become increasingly common; indeed, editable and shareable maps, such as layers on Google Earth, and edit-shared documents, represent additional examples. Versioned bodies of information can employ content-driven reputation systems, which compute user reputation on the basis of content evolution: authors of long-lived contributions gain reputation, while authors of contributions which are short-lived or reverted lose reputation [2] . Content-driven reputation systems thus provide an incentive to contribute lasting content; they are also intrinsically objective, as the reputation changes are tied to content evolution. For instance, the only way a user A can denigrate a user B is by reverting B's contribution; if subsequent users reinstate B's contribution, it is A's reputation, rather than B's, which will suffer the most. The content-driven reputation of Wikipedia authors has been shown to be a good statistical predictor of the longevity (and thus, presumably, of the quality) of their future contributions [2] ; author reputation has also been used as the basis for computing text trust [1] .
Reputation confers status, and it can be used to manage edit rights to high-visibility information, or as the basis for the computation of content quality [1, 3] . Consequently, reputation systems are subject to attack by users who wish to increase their reputation without performing useful (and thus, time-consuming) work. Thus far, the use of content-driven reputation has not led to resistance to attacks. Indeed, the reputation system proposed in [2] can be subject to a wide number of Sybil attacks, in which a single person uses multiple identities (or sock-puppets) to increase her reputation without providing valuable contributions [7, 4, 14, 11, 9] . In the simplest of these attacks, a user controls two identities: a primary identity A, and a "sacrificial" identityÂ. In the attack,Â first performs vandalism, for instance by deleting the entire content of a wiki article, or by inserting spurious text; A then promptly reinstates the original content of the article. As subsequent users build on the unvandalized content of the page, A reputation will rise, since A's intervention is preserved. Many similar attacks are possible, and some of them are described in this paper.
Attacks to reputation systems are a pervasive problem, and [4, 9, 11] provide comprehensive surveys of the general problem and of solution approaches. In this paper, we show that content-driven reputation systems can be made resistant to many forms of Sybil attacks. The key idea consists in exploiting the connection between content evolution, and reputation computation. In particular, reputation changes are due to content modification that can be inspected by all users. Thus, under the assumption that content is visited by a wide variety of users, as it happens in real systems, we will be able to provide strong guarantees of immunity to attacks. The algorithms we present do not depend on the specific nature of the content, and can be applied to wikis, as well as to other versioned content: all we need to assume is that we have some way to measure the distance between contributions. In wikis and other text-based systems, edit distance can be used [18, 15, 6] . Nevertheless, we chose to present the algorithms in the context of wikis, both to provide readers with a familiar context, and because the evaluation of the algorithms will be performed on the French Wikipedia.
Our starting point is the content-driven reputation algorithm proposed in [2] . The algorithm assesses the value of each contribution by comparing it with past and future versions of the content, due to different authors. If the contribution went in the general direction of content evolution, as estimated from the change from past to future versions, the contribution is judged positively, and its author gains reputation; otherwise, it is judged negatively, and the author loses reputation.
As a first step, we describe the REPUTATION-CAP algorithm, where the reputation that can be gained by the contributing author's is capped by the reputation of the authors of the past and future versions to which it is compared. The REPUTATION-CAP algorithm prevents groups of sock-puppets from increasing their maximum reputation unless they perform useful work, or work that is considered positively by higher-reputation users. Unfortunately, the REPUTATION-CAP algorithm also prevents the global reputation growth of system users. In particular, if everybody starts with low reputation, nobody can ever gain high reputation. To remedy this, we relax the assumptions on the REPUTATION-CAP algorithm, allowing users to gain uncapped reputation, provided their contributions have first withstood the test of time without being judged negatively; this yields the REPUTATION-CAP-NIX algorithm. We show that under weak assumptions on content visitation rate, assumptions that hold for most real systems including the Wikipedia, the REPUTATION-CAP-NIX is able to prevent Sybil attacks while allowing global reputation growth.
Next, we turn to the truthfulness property, stating that if a user wishes to perform an edit e, the user cannot gain by splitting e in multiple sub-edits, or by employing complex editing schemes involving sock-puppets, compared to doing e directly. This property is inspired by mechanism design in game theory: there, a mechanism (such as an auction procedure) is truthful if it is a weakly dominant strategy for the players to reveal their utility [5, 8, 16, 12] . We show that while the REPUTATION-CAP-NIX algorithm does not enjoy the truthfulness property, a simple modification does. The modification allows some reputation denial attacks, but this can be once more remedied under weak assumptions, met in the real world, on the relative infrequency of disputes (reversion wars) among highreputation authors. This leads to our final algorithm, the LOCAL-GLOBAL algorithm, which is our candidate for implementation in on-line content-driven reputation systems. The algorithm is resistant to Sybil attacks and truthful, under weak assumption about visitation and editing dynamics of a site.
We evaluate the algorithms with respect to their ability to produce informative, high-quality reputation information, which has good predictive value with respect to the longevity of future contributions by the authors. Using a 100,000-article, 56-million revision subset of the French Wikipedia as our dataset, we show that the modifications required to make the algorithms robust do not decrease the quality of the reputation they compute.
CONTENT-DRIVEN REPUTATION
Before presenting the robust reputation algorithms, it is useful to summarize the content-driven algorithm of [2] , on which the robust algorithms are based, and examine attacks to which this original algorithm can be subject.
Notation
We consider content-driven reputation algorithms which compute author reputation on the basis of the sequence of versions of each wiki article. The algorithms are on-line, and examine each version as it is introduced in the system. For a version v, we indicate with a(v) its author, and with t(v) the time at which it was created. We denote the versions of an article p by v
. .; the letter p stands for page. For simplicity, we assume that all versions have distinct timestamps. We often write ai for a(vi), and ti for t(vi), when no confusion arises. We also indicate by Idx(v p i ) = i the sequential position of the version in the page. The algorithms will use only the most recent value r(a) of the reputation of author a. To analyze the algorithms, however, we need to reason about how author reputation evolves in time. Thus, we denote by r(a, t) the reputation of author a at time t; we assume that this is a left-continuous function, so that if the reputation of a is updated precisely at time t, then r(a, t) denotes the value immediately preceding the update. We assume that the reputation is bounded to the range [0, Tmax], for some Tmax > 0, so that if a reputation increment or decrement causes the reputation to go below 0 (resp., above Tmax), the reputation is set to 0 (resp., to Tmax). In the following, we will occasionally omit the superscript p and focus on one article at a time; however, we stress that the algorithms operate strictly chronologically, according to the order in which versions are entered into the wiki.
The BASIC algorithm
The content-driven reputation of [2] is based on the idea of assigning reputation to authors according to how long their contributions last: authors of long-lived contributions gain reputation, and authors of short-lived or reverted contributions lose reputation. In [2] , it was proposed to measure the contribution given by an author in two ways: according to the text that was inserted (the text contribution), and according to the overall modification performed (the edit contribution). The edit contribution largely subsumes the text one; for this reason, we discuss here only the algorithm based on edit contributions. Our evaluation, reported in Section 5, will show that considering edit contributions only does not yield inferior quality for the computed reputation, compared to the algorithm of [2] .
The BASIC algorithm takes, as a basic building block, an algorithm to compute the edit distance between two text documents. The
of the amount of text insertions, deletions, and replacements that is required to transform v into v ′ . The problem of computing edit distances has been well-studied in the literature [18, 15, 6] ; the particular approach we chose is discussed in [2] . All authors initially have reputation zero. When a version v p k is entered into the wiki, the BASIC algorithm considers triples of versions (v 
Thus, the algorithm computes the ratio
between the "useful" change towards v p k , and the "total" change. The situation is illustrated in Figure 1 . We say that the version v 
where
is the amount of change performed in the edit from u to v, and r(a(z), t(z)) ≥ 0 is the reputation of the judge a(z) at the time z is created; w is a monotonic increasing function. As in [2] , we take w(x) = log(1.1 + x), thus reducing the influence of high-reputation authors: if this were not done, our experiments indicated that high-reputation authors would wield disproportionate power. The results of this paper are independent on the particular choice of w, provided w(0) > 0, and x ≥ y implies w(x) ≥ w(y).
We present the formal description of the BASIC algorithm as Algorithm 1 where we present the updates in the reputation of authors when the current version v k of an article is committed. The algorithm is on-line, and processes versions as they are committed, updating user reputations. In the algorithms, we write r(a) to denote the current estimate of the reputation of author a; the value r(a) is persistent across invocations of the algorithm; in practice, this will be stored in a database entry associated with a. For a listv, we denote by |v| the number of elements, by vi its i-th element, where 1 ≤ i ≤ |v|, and byv ⋆ u the result of appending the element u at the end ofv.
Attacks against the BASIC algorithm
The BASIC algorithm is prone to attacks, in which users can increase their reputation without performing any amount of productive work. These attacks rely on sock-puppets, or multiple user identities that are controlled by the same person.
A simple attack of this kind is the delete-restore attack. The attack can be carried out by a person having two identities: a main identity A, whose reputation the person wants to increase, and a sock-puppet identity A ′ . In the attack, A ′ removes all the text of the article, producing an empty version v ′ of course loses reputation, but this does not matter: this identity is simply a "sacrificial" one, and all it matters is that it is permitted to carry out edits; if A ′ is banned, the person controlling A and A ′ can simply create a new sock-puppet A ′′ . The delete-restore attack is somewhat easy to spot: wiki administrators may become suspicious if they notice that A is always restoring the text of deleted pages, while doing little else. A variation that is harder to spot is the add-restore attack, in which the sock-puppet identity A ′ introduces spurious text in an article (for instance, a nonsensical paragraph, spam, or other clearly inappropriate material), which A proceeds to remove in the immediately subsequent edit.
Another attack is the fake-followers attack. In this attack, a person controls a main identity A, and some sock-puppet identities A0, A1, A2, · · · . Identity A performs an edit v These attacks have many variations, and are only a representative sample of the set of possible successful attacks to the BASIC algorithm. The focus of this paper is not to provide a classification of attacks, but to present modified content-driven algorithms that are robust with respect to any sock-puppet attack.
ROBUST ALGORITHMS
In this section, we develop from algorithm BASIC new algorithms
Algorithm 1 BASIC Algorithm
Input: A new version z for an article. Persistent variables across invocations: r,v.
that are resistant to Sybil attacks and that enjoy the truthfulness property.
The REPUTATION-CAP algorithm: no free reputation increase
The first algorithm, REPUTATION-CAP, bounds the reputation increase, so that the maximum reputation of a set of identities can increase only if useful work is performed. In order to update the reputation of an author, we see from (1) 
: this prevents the use of low-reputation sock-puppets for increasing the reputation of the main identity. In the following, for simplicity we drop the superscript p, since the algorithm only compares versions belonging to the same article.
The REPUTATION-CAP algorithm is obtained by modifying the reputation increase of the basic algorithm. The REPUTATION-CAP algorithm first computes Inc(vi, vj , v k ) as in (2), and then proceeds as follows:
• If Inc(vi, vj , v k ) < 0, then the reputation of aj is incremented by Inc(vi, vj , v k ) (leading to a reputation decrease); this coincides with the basic algorithm.
• If Inc(vi, vj , v k ) ≥ 0, the algorithm first retrieves the current reputations r(ai, t k ), r(aj , t k ), r(a k , t k ) of ai, aj, a k ; it then updates the reputation of aj to
The formula (3) has two consequences. If the reputation of aj is greater than that of ai or a k , the reputation of aj cannot increase, and it can decrease if Qual(vi, vj , v k ) < 0. On the other hand, if the reputation of aj is lower than both the reputations of ai and a k , then the reputation of aj can increase, but only up to the minimum of the reputations of the "referees" ai and a k . Thus, an author can gain high reputation only when her versions are compared with versions produced by high-reputation authors. In particular, if an author a starts with low reputation, and if her versions are only compared with the versions of authors of reputation below r, the author a will be unable to gain reputation above r. This is the mechanism that prevents the sock-puppet attacks outlined in Section 2.3. To ensure that enough triples with high-reputation reference points are considered, when a version v k is entered, the algorithm considers all triples (i, j, k) with 0 < i < j < k and k − i ≤ m, thus lifting the restriction i + 1 = j of algorithm BASIC. We present the formal description of the REPUTATION-CAP algorithm as Algorithm 2. Observe that Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 differ both in Step 1 in considering the triples, and in reputation increment.
The key property we wish to show of the REPUTATION-CAP algorithm can be informally summarized as follows: If a person controls a set of sock-puppets whose maximum reputation is r, then unless useful editing work is done, no sock-puppet can increase the reputation beyond r. To formalize this statement, we need to provide a definition of "useful". We formalize this notion as follows. DEFINITION 1. (useful work) Given r ∈ [0, Tmax] and a triple (i, j, k) with 0 < i < j < k, we say that the triple (i, j, k) is r-good iff both ai and a k have reputation at least r when the triple is created or evaluated; precisely, (i, j, k) is r-good if r(ai, ti) ≥ r or r(ai, t k ) ≥ r´and r(a k , t k ) ≥ r. We say that the version vj is r-useful iff Qual(vi, vj , v k ) > 0 for some rgood triple (i, j, k). A version that is not r-useful work is called r-useless.
Intuitively, this definition states that the version vj is useful iff there is at least a pair of reference versions vi and v k , one in the past, and the other in the future, both by authors of reputation at least r, that judge in positive fashion the contribution of vj . High-reputation authors do not always fully agree agree on what is the best direction of change for an article; the definition gives the benefit of the doubt to version vj , and calls it useful if it agrees with the direction of change undertaken by at least some of these authors.
Nevertheless, we argue that producing a useful version does not come for free, but in the great majority of cases, requires some effort on the part of the author. A useful version, after all, is a version that comes closer to some future contribution by high-reputation authors: it is unlikely that such a version can be produced by acts that do not require effort, such as removing or inserting text at random. The following theorem provides the main property of the REPUTATION-CAP algorithm, which shows that a set of authors cannot increase their maximal reputation without doing useful work. We formalize this property as the no-free-increase property. This theorem rules out Sybil attacks such as the ones outlined in Section 2.3.
No-free-increase-above-r property. For all sets U of authors, and for all times t, if the following assumptions both hold, then so does the consequence:
Assumptions:
• At time t, all authors in U have reputation below r ∈ [0, Tmax].
• After time t, the authors in U only contribute ruseless versions.
Consequence: No author in U will gain reputation greater than r after time t. PROOF. For r ∈ [0, Tmax], consider a set U of authors, and a time t, satisfying the assumptions of the no-free-increase-above-r property. Notice that the reputation of an author a ∈ U can only grow when a triple (i, j, k) is considered for feedback at time t k , where 0 < i < j < k and a = a(vj ). Consider all such triples, and assume inductively that r(a, t k ) < r. We will show that the reputation of a cannot increase above r as a consequence of (i, j, k) being considered. There are two cases. If r(ai, t k ) ≤ r or r(a k , t k ) ≤ r, then by (3) we have that the reputation of u cannot increase above r. If r(ai, t k ) > r and r(a k , t k ) > r, then since the version vj is r-useless by assumption, we have that Qual(vi, vj , v k ) < 0, leading to Inc(vi, vj , v k ) < 0, so that the reputation of a again cannot increase above r.
The REPUTATION-CAP-NIX algorithm: allowing global reputation growth
While the REPUTATION-CAP algorithm is effective against Sybil attacks, it has one major drawback: if applied throughout the lifetime of a wiki, it would prevent the maximal reputation of wiki authors from growing. In particular, our basic content-driven reputation system starts by assigning reputation 0 to all authors. If we applied the REPUTATION-CAP algorithm from the beginning, authors reputations would not be allowed to grow.
We note, first of all, that this drawback is pertinent to growing wikis. The REPUTATION-CAP algorithm is well suited to mature wikis, such as the Wikipedia in the major languages (English, German, and French being the largest), which have a large pool of authors who have reputation very close to the top value Tmax. In mature wikis, high-reputation authors can increase the reputation of other authors, and the pool of high-reputation authors would most likely be self-renovating.
Nevertheless, we wish to obtain a reputation algorithm that is not only resistant to Sybil attacks, but that can also be used from the inception. To this end, we modify the REPUTATION-CAP ALGO-RITHM, obtaining the REPUTATION-CAP-NIX algorithm. The modified algorithm is based on the following idea. On the Wikipedia, it is very unlikely that low-quality or vandalistic edits survive for long time; indeed, according to some studies, vandalism has a very high probability of being removed from a page in a few minutes [17, 10, 13] . If a version survives for long enough without having ever accumulated negative feedback, then the version is unlikely to be part of a Sybil attack, and we revert to the basic algorithm, which enables the reputation of an author to grow, even though the author's contributions are only compared with the contributions of lower reputation authors.
The REPUTATION-CAP-NIX algorithm takes as input a delay value T > 0, called the validation interval. When a version vj is created, we set its nix bit to 0, indicating that vj has not received any negative feedback. When a version v k is entered, the REPUTATION-CAP-NIX algorithm considers again all triples (i, j, k) with 0 < i < j < k and k − i ≤ m; when considering (i, j, k), it proceeds as follows:
1. If one of these two conditions holds, set the nix bit to 1; otherwise, leave it unchanged:
2. If the nix bit of tj is 1 or t k −tj ≤ T , we update the reputation of aj using the REPUTATION-CAP ALGORITHM, that is, by the amount given in (3).
3. If the nix bit of tj is 0 and t k − tj > T , we update the reputation of aj using the basic algorithm, that is, by the amount given in (2).
Condition (4) states that, if a revision received negative feedback within time T , we set its nix bit, so that the version will not benefit from the more liberal basic algorithm after time T has elapsed. As we will assume that visits from high-reputation authors are spaced less than T , this helps prevent reputation increase when no useful work is performed. The condition (5) has to do with the fact that we consider only triples (i, j, k) with k − i ≤ m, so that our evaluation algorithm has a finite horizon. If we omitted clause (5), then an author could perform a stuffing attack, immediately preceding each of her contributions by m contributions of a sock-puppet, and avoiding in this way the nixing bit to be set via (4) . We present a formal description of the reputation updates and nixing of the REPUTATION-CAP-NIX algorithm as Algorithm3.
To state the results about the algorithm, we define precisely the notions of checking an article, visitation frequency, and global reputation growth.
DEFINITION 2. (checking an article) We say that an author a checks the article at time t if a reads the version v of the article, decides what would be the best version v
′ , and inserts v ′ in the system whenever v = v ′ .
DEFINITION 3. (visitation frequency)
We say that an article p is edited (resp. checked) more frequently than T by authors of reputation at last r if every time interval I of length T contains at least one time instant t ∈ I where an author a edited (resp. checked) the article, and such that r(a, t
The above definition of visitation frequency counts visits where the author has reputation above r not only at the time of visit, but also for time T afterwards. This is a technical condition necessary to prove the theorems. In practice, author reputations vary slowly in time, and we consider time-lengths T of at most a few days, so that authors whose reputation is above r at a time t will almost always retain reputation greater than r until time t + T .
The global-reputation-growth property ensures that the global reputation of wiki users can grow.
Algorithm 3 REPUTATION-CAP-NIX Algorithm
Input: A new version z for an article, and validation interval T . Persistent variables across invocations: r,v, Nix, with |v| = |Nix|. 1.v :=v ⋆ z; Nix := Nix ⋆ 0; k := |v| 2. for triples (i, j, k) with 0 < i < j < k and PROOF. For the first part of the theorem, consider a set U , and a time t, that satisfy the assumptions of the no-free-increase-above-r property. An author a ∈ U can increase her reputation when a triple (i, j, k) is considered, with aj = a, and we distinguish two cases.
1. The triple (i, j, k) is such that r(a k , t k ) > r and r(ai, t k ) > r. As before, by hypothesis we have Inc(vi, vj , v k ) < 0, so that the reputation of a = aj cannot increase.
The triple
(a) If t k − tj ≤ T , then the reputation update (3) is used, preventing aj's reputation from growing above min(r(ai, t k ), r(a k , t k )) ≤ r.
(b) If t k − tj > T , then due to the hypothesis on the check frequency by authors of reputation at least r, there must have been two times t ′ and t ′′ , with t ′′ − t ′ < T , and with t ′ < tj < t ′′ < t k , where authors of reputation at least r checked the article. This means that there were two versions v h and v l , with t h ≤ t ′ < tj ≤ t l ≤ t ′′ < t k , such that users of reputation above r agreed with t h and t l . We consider two cases:
i. If l − h ≤ m, then since by hypothesis aj did ruseless work, we have Inc(v h , vj , v l ) < 0. Furthermore, from t ′′ − t ′ < T and t ′ < tj ≤ t l ≤ t ′′ we derive t ′′ − tj < T , so that the nix bit of vj has been set due to (4) .
ii. If l − h > m, notice that v h is the version immediately preceding time t ′ , and t l − t ′ < T . This means that there must be at least m versions between times t l and t ′ , and the nix bit of vj has been set due to (5).
In either case, the nix bit of vj is set, so that the reputation increment to a = aj is given by (3), ensuring once more that the reputation of a does not increase beyond r.
For the second part of the theorem, note that if the authors in U do useful work, leading to positive ratios (1), then the nix bit of their contributions will not be set, so that the BASIC algorithm may be used, allowing their reputations to eventually grow above r.
ROBUST AND TRUTHFUL ALGORITHMS
We say an algorithm for reputation computation enjoys the truthfulness property if an author who wishes to perform an edit cannot gain by splitting the edit into multiple edits, or by employing complex editing schemes, as compared to truthfully performing the edit in a single step. We first show that the REPUTATION-CAP and the REPUTATION-CAP-NIX algorithm can be subject to a zig-zag-attack that violates the truthfulness property.
The Zig-Zag-Attack. Consider an author a with reputation r at time t such that the author can perform an r-useful edit ej to produce a version vj . When the version vj is judged by a later high reputed author of version v k , and compared against vj−1 (i.e., the triple (vj−1, vj , v k ) is considered for reputation increment), then the author a gains in reputation. In the zig-zag attack, the author splits the edit ej in multiple steps, producing versionsv1,v2,v3, . . . ,v f = vj such that for all Figure 2 ). All these versions are made with the same identity of a, thus preventing feedback of one version on the other. These versions can be chosen in zig-zag fashion, so that d(vi,vi+1) is large, for 1 ≤ i ≤ f . Consider now the total increment (2) due to vj−1 
If the versionsv1,v2,v3, . . . ,v f = vj proceed in "zig-zag" fashion (see Figure 2 again), then Qual(vj−1,vi, v k ) > 0 can be largely independent from i, so that by choosing f large enough, and for 1 < i ≤ f , by choosing d(vi−1,vi) large, the total reputation increase (6) can be made large as well. For instance, consider f = 3, and v1 =v3 = vj , and takev2 with
Then, clearly the author gains by splitting the original edit vj−1 vj into three sub-edits.
The LOCAL algorithm: encouraging truthful edits
The zig-zag-attack against truthfulness for the REPUTATION-CAP (and the REPUTATION-CAP-NIX) algorithm was made possible by the fact that the quality of a revisionvi is measured according to its global role Qual(vj−1,vi, v k ), while its "size" is determined by the local distance d(vi−1,vi). To prevent this attack, we constrain the algorithm to consider only local feedback. The LOCAL algorithm follows the REPUTATION-CAP-NIX algorithm: when a version v k is entered, it considers all triples (i, j, k) with 0 < i < j < k and k − i ≤ m, as in that algorithm. However, (2) is modified as follows:
Thus, while the LOCAL algorithm follows REPUTATION-CAP-NIX for the use of the nix bits, it only increases reputation when the revision being evaluated is compared with the immediately preceding one. The LOCAL algorithm if formally described as Algorithm 4. Since the LOCAL algorithm considers only a different set of triples as compared to the REPUTATION-CAP-NIX ALGORITHM for reputation increment, but follows the same procedure as the REPUTATION-CAP-NIX algorithm, a theorem corresponding to Theorem 2 holds. ′ as compared to σ. PROOF. We consider the two evolution histories σ and σ ′ . In σ ′ the edit ej is replaced by multiple edits by identities in U , otherwise σ and σ ′ coincide. Let vj−1 be the version before the edit ej in σ, and we denote the versions produced by edits of identities in U in σ ′ asv1,v2, . . . ,v f = vj (i.e., the final versionv f of the edits by U is the version vj of σ). The following analysis shows that the maximal reputation gain in σ ′ is no more than the maximal reputation gain in σ. Consider a versionvi produced by an identity in u ∈ U with maximal reputation r. Let the versionvi be judged by a later version v. If v is produced by an edit of an identity in U , then the reputation of the author of the version judgingvi is at most r (since the maximal reputation of identities in U is r). Thus the reputation of u does not increase. Hence we consider the case when the judging version is a version v k after vj , and show the total reputation increment in σ ′ is bounded by the reputation increment in σ. We consider a triple (vj−1, vj , v k ) for reputation increment in σ. The sum γ of the reputation increments in σ ′ for edits by U producing vj as judged by v k is given as follows:
We obtain the first equality by applying (7) for reputation increment, and the second equality follows since
Sincev f = vj , it follows that the above sum is equal to cs · w(r(a k , t k )) ·`d(vj−1, v k ) − d(vj, v k )´. In the evolution history σ, the reputation increment for the triple (j − 1, j, k) is given by It follows that γ = IncLocal(vj−1, vj , v k ). It follows that the maximal reputation in σ ′ for identities in U is no more than the maximal reputation in σ. We remark that it is possible that a triple (j−1, j, k) is considered for reputation increment for the evolution history σ, but all sub-edits by identities in U that produce vj in σ ′ do not get reputation increment being judged by v k . This is because since in σ ′ multiple edits produce vj, the number of edits between an edit by U and v k may exceed m in σ ′ , whereas the number of edits between vj−1 and v k may be smaller than m in σ. Hence the maximal reputation in σ can exceed the maximal reputation in σ ′ .
Theorem 4 shows that if an author wishes to do a η-units of useful work, then the most rational policy to gain reputation is to truthfully do the η-units of useful work at once. Thus by Theorem 3 and Theorem 4 we obtain that the LOCAL algorithm has two highly desired properties: robustness against sock-puppet attacks, and truthfullness for useful work. However, the algorithm can be subject to a denial-of-reputation attack. In the REPUTATION-CAP-NIX ALGO-RITHM, for edits that are nixed or have not crossed the validation interval, the reputation cannot increase beyond the minimum of the two judging versions. In the LOCAL algorithm, one judging point of a version is fixed as the immediate previous version. Hence low reputed users can perform many edits, and ensure that the following useful edits are not credited with reputation increment. We remedy this partially in the LOCAL-GLOBAL algorithm. entirely reverted, and we say that r(a(v
The

